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Changing Influences on the Concept of  ‘Media Influence’ 
 
Terry Flew, Professor of Media and Communications, Queensland 
University of Technology 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The concept of media influence has a long history in media and communication studies, and 
has also had significant influence on public policy. This paper revisits questions of media 
influence through three short case studies. First, it critically analyses the strongly partisan 
position of News Corporation’s newspapers against the Labor government during the 2013 
Australian Federal election to consider whether the potential for media influence equated to 
the effective use of media power. Second, it discusses the assumption in broadcasting 
legislation, in both the UK and Australia, that terrestrial broadcasting should be subject to 
more content regulation than subscription services, and notes the new challenges arising from 
digital television and over-the-top video streaming services. Finally, it discusses the rise of 
multi-platform global content aggregators such as Google, Apple, Microsoft and others, and 
how their rise necessitates changes in ways of thinking about concentration of media 
ownership, and regulations that may ensue from it.  
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Media Influence as a Key Concept in Media and Communication Studies 
and Media Policy 
 
The concept of media influence has a venerable history in both media and communications 
studies and in public policy.1 Many of the key debates of media and communications studies 
have revolved around the question of how, and in what circumstances, media institutions, 
practices and content can be said to influence society, politics and culture. McQuail (2005: 
50-51) has observed that many of the earliest accounts of the media’s role in society looked 
to it having – for good or ill – society-wide influences, including its use as a propaganda tool 
for despotic leaderships, its potential for social integration in modern urbanised societies, and 
its potential to act as a ‘mass educator’, particularly in developing countries. In the mass 
communication tradition, concepts such as the ‘two-step flow’ as articulated by Elihu Katz 
and Paul Lazarsfeld in the 1940s, and the ‘agenda-setting theory of news’ developed by 
Maxwell McCombs (2004), are examples of theories that sought to operationalise the concept 
of media influence. From the standpoint of critical media and cultural studies, the Gramscian 
concept of cultural hegemony developed by Stuart Hall, David Morley and others attest to the 
continuing attempts to map the contours of media influence and how they both shape, and are 
shaped by, the political economy of capitalism (During 2003). In policy debates, the question 
of media influence hangs over why some media forms are more subject to government 
regulation than others: as will be discussed below, there has been a longstanding view that 
broadcasting is a particularly influential medium, by virtue of its capacity to reach all 
members of society simultaneously, and in a privatised domestic setting characterised by the 
co-presence of men and women, and adults and children.  
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The commitment to public service broadcasting, and the licencing of commercial 
broadcasters, arose in a context where it was believed that mass communications media such 
as radio and television were particularly likely to be able to influence public opinion, and that 
there was a social responsibility to direct such influence towards the public good. From a 
historical perspective, John Thompson has drawn attention to the centrality of 
communications media to the formation of modern societies, through ‘the social organization 
of symbolic power’ and the capacity of media as cultural institutions to ‘intervene in the 
course of events, to influence the actions of others and indeed to create events, by means of 
the production and transmission of symbolic forms’ (Thompson 1995: 17).  
 
The pioneering media sociology of Jeremy Tunstall focused on questions of media power and 
influence, whether through media policy, the relationship of media to liberal-democratic 
societies, media professions and the management of social relations within media institutions, 
and the changing contours of global media power and influence (Tumber 2005). In the latter 
case, Tunstall famous proclaimed in 1978 that The Media Are American, observing that the 
influence of U.S. production cultures and values in global media was considerably greater 
than the apparent reach of U.S. media content, only to question that account 30 years later in 
The Media Were American (Tunstall 2008), where he drew attention to the fast-growing 
influence of the BRICS nations in the global media environment, and the crisis of credibility 
of U.S. news agencies in the wake of their reporting of the Iraq War from 2003.2  
 
This paper will consider contemporary questions relating to media influence from three 
perspectives. First, there is a case study of newspaper reporting of the 2013 Australian 
Federal election to show how complex it can be to attribute influence to media in terms of 
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political outcomes, and the continuing relevance of intervening variables in such research. 
Second, the paper discusses questions that arise in the context of media convergence, and the 
uncoupling of media content from particular delivery platforms, for differential forms of 
media regulation that derive from the perceived influence of particular media platforms. 
Finally, there is a discussion of the question of who is a ‘media company’ in this 
environment, and some new questions that will need to be asked by policy-makers and 
researchers about media influence. 
 
Media Influence or Media Power? 
 
In this paper, I use the term ‘media influence’ rather than ‘media power’. I observe that the 
concept of  ‘media power’ is used by Thompson, Tunstall, Hall and others as an alternative to 
the term ‘influence’, that is seen as being aligned to liberal-pluralist political theory (Hall 
1982), or to the ‘new revisionism’ in media and communication studies that sees the active 
audience as effectively resistant to mass media messages (Curran 1995). At the same time, 
the term ‘media influence’ is preferred as it suggests that the extent to which power exists in 
relation to media and the social environment remains uncertain, and its effectiveness cannot 
simply be inferred from its potential existence. For instance, news coverage may influence 
how voters behave in elections, but cannot determine who wins or loses them. The risk with 
the term ‘media power’ is that it simply assumed what it needs to prove i.e. that the media 
have significant society-wide influences. In other words, to the degree that power exists, it 
exists in terms of the ability to influence outcomes rather than to determine them.  
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An interesting test case here was the Australian Federal election held in September 2013. The 
election saw a change of government, with the Liberal-National Party coalition led by Tony 
Abbott winning office over the Labor Party led by Kevin Rudd, and a notable feature of the 
election was that, with the exception of one newspaper – the Melbourne Age – all of the 
Australian print media called for the election of an Abbott government. Of the 11 capital city 
and national daily newspapers that advocated a Coalition vote, eight are owned by Rupert 
Murdoch’s News Corporation, and Murdoch had made it very clear, on Twitter and in public 
speeches, that he believed a change of government was necessary.  
 
In the case of two of the tabloid newspapers, the Sydney Daily Telegraph and the Courier-
Mail in Queensland, this support was particularly vocal. Both papers declared for the 
Coalition on the first day after the election was announced, whereas most papers carry an 
Editorial in the last week of the campaign declaring their views, and the Telegraph began its 
formal coverage with a Monday front page headline, ‘Kick This Mob Out’ alongside a 
picture of Prime Minister Rudd. Other notable headlines during the campaign included ‘Does 
This Guy Ever Shut Up?’ (Courier-Mail, about Rudd in an election debate), ‘It’s a Ruddy 
Mess’ (Melbourne Herald-Sun), ‘Kevin Deadly Sins’ (Sunday Mail), ‘Price of Labor’ 
(Telegraph), ‘Dead Kev Bounce’ (Courier-Mail) and ‘Australia Needs Tony’ (Sunday 
Telegraph). Rudd was also represented as ‘Mister Rude’, based on the Mr. Men books, after a 
complaint from a makeup artist who worked with him, and Rudd and Deputy Prime Minister 
Anthony Albanese were represented as Colonel Klink and Sergeant Schultz from the 1960s 
television program ‘Hogan’s Heroes’.  
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On the question of why News Corporation papers took an anti-Labor position, one factor was 
opposition to the recommendations of the Finkelstein Inquiry into print media regulation, 
which proposed replacing the proprietor-funded Australian Press Council with a government-
funded statutory regulator, the News Media Council. The Finkelstein Review was various 
described on its release in February 2012 as ‘Labor’s Plan to Control the Media’, ‘Bringing 
the Media to Heel’ and ‘A Threat to Free Speech’ (quoted in Flew and Swift 2013). When the 
Communications Minister, Senator Stephen Conroy, put forward legislation responding to the 
Finkelstein Review in March 2013, the headline of the Daily Telegraph featured Conroy 
alongside Joseph Stalin, Mao Zedong, Robert Mugabe and Kim Jong-Un, saying ‘These 
Tyrants Want to Control the Media … Conroy Joins Them’. Over the page, in case the 
original message was missed, Conroy’s head was Photoshopped onto Joseph Stalin. The issue 
of whether Labor’s commitment to a high-speed National Broadband Network posed a threat 
to the business model of cable television provider FOXTEL, which is 50 per cent owned by 
News Corporation, may also have been a factor.  
 
So we have the apparent exercise of media power, and motives to do so, but the evidence of 
whether it influenced the election results is considerably more mixed. The two-party 
preferred (2PP) swing to the Coalition was 3.65 per cent on the 2010 result, leading to the 
Coalition winning 17 seats; while this was a significant swing, it was well within the 
projections of all opinion polls, and was ultimately a lower swing against Labor than many 
had been expecting. It is also notable that the largest 2PP swings against Labor were in states 
such as Victoria (5.97 per cent), South Australia (5.54 per cent) and Tasmania (11.27 per 
cent), where the newspaper coverage was less hostile than in Queensland (where the swing 
against Labor was 1.31 per cent) and New South Wales (2.82 per cent). In the two parts of 
Australia where both the number of marginal seats is highest and the Telegraph and Courier-
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Mail have their most influence – Western Sydney and Brisbane – swings against Labor were 
generally smaller than expected, and in some electorates there was an unexpected swing to 
Labor. It also needs to be remebered that most non-News Corporation publications also 
favoured a Coalition victory. The Australian Financial Review, for instance, advocated a vote 
for the Coalition on the day after the election was announced, and The Age, The Economist 
and The Guardian Australia online site were the only mainstream publications to advocate 
Labor’s return to office.  
 
In other words, the evidence on whether the News Corporation papers influenced the 2013 
Australian Federal election result through their political coverage is unclear. They certainly 
would not have helped Labor, but they also may not have helped themselves, given that the 
Australian newspaper market segments along geographical rather than political lines, and 
they were potentially alienating their not insignificant Labor-voting readerships. There is not 
a clear correlation between the parts of Australia where the circulation of newspapers with 
the most hostile coverage were located and overall voting patterns. If The Sun could claim 
after the Conservatives retained power in the 1992 British General Election that “It was The 
Sun wot won it”, then this is not a claim that could be confidently made by the Murdoch 
tabloids in Australia in 2013.  
 
Audiovisual Media Influence: Broadcasting, Subscription Television, and 
Over-the-Top Services 
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One of the features of broadcast media regulation throughout the world is that it tends, 
overall, to be more regulated than print media. Concepts of fairness, universality, social 
responsibility and the public interest featuring prominently in broadcasting laws around the 
world. In some broadcasting systems, these are expressed directly through the Charters of 
public service broadcasters, and in others they are applied more indirectly through the 
licencing conditions attached to commercially based and privately owned broadcasters 
(Hoffman-Reim 1996; Feintuck 1999). Among the reasons generally cited for such 
regulations are: 
 To ensure universal availability to the general population of the country of broadcast 
services; 
 To allocate frequencies in an equitable and orderly manner and supervise adherence to 
rules laid down; 
 To ensure a wide range of services and access opportunities according to the needs of 
society - meaning diversity in social, political, cultural and local/regional terms; 
 To promote high quality of content provided as far as possible according to locally 
decided values and standards, with particular reference to information, education, 
advertising, culture, taste and decency. 
 
Broadcasting legislation was challenged in the 1980s and 1990s by the question of how to 
deal with emergent cable and satellite subscription services. In particular, the question arose 
of what forms of regulation should apply to such services if not the full suite of measures 
applied to terrestrial broadcasters, and on what bases could the distinction be justified. In 
administering its responsibilities in relation to broadcasting standards for terrestrial 
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broadcasters, the UK regulator Ofcom is required under Section 319(4) of the 
Communications Act 2003 to give consideration to: 
(a) the degree of harm or offence likely to be caused by the inclusion of any particular 
sort of material in programmes generally, or in programmes of a particular 
description; 
(b) the likely size and composition of the potential audience for programmes included 
in television and radio services generally, or in television and radio services of a 
particular description; 
 (c) the likely expectation of the audience as to the nature of a programme’s content 
and the extent to which the nature of a programme’s content can be brought to the 
attention of potential members of the audience; 
(d) the likelihood of persons who are unaware of the nature of a programme’s content 
being unintentionally exposed, by their own actions, to that content (Ofcom 2013:71-
72).  
While provision (a) relates specifically to the content of programs, sections (b) and (c) relate 
directly to the type of service in question, and section (d) implies that terrestrial broadcasting 
services are more likely to be the subject of inadvertent exposure to content than those 
associated with subscription services. On the basis of provisions such as these, more ‘light 
touch’ regulation of subscription services can be justified on the basis of the services being 
more specifically ‘media of choice’ than those which are freely available to all viewers, and 
hence less subject to provisions concerning decency, protection of children, and impartiality 
in news and current affairs programs.  
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Similarly, under the Australian Broadcasting Services Act 1992 a commercial broadcasting 
service is one that provides programs intended to appeal to the general public, are able to be 
received by commonly available equipment, are made available free to the general public, 
and are usually funded by advertising revenue. Under the Australian provisions, it is the 
payment of a fee for such services rather than the reach of the programs that is the key 
distinction made, but it is again assumed that cable and satellite services reach fewer viewers 
than terrestrial broadcasters, and hence require fewer regulations. For example, ‘watershed’ 
restrictions on the times of the day/evening when certain types of programs (e.g. those 
containing strong violence) can be shown apply to terrestrial broadcasters but not to 
subscription broadcasters.  
 
These distinctions have proven to be broadly workable where the equipment required for 
access to non-traditional broadcast media content was not widely available, and when the 
number of channels available through terrestrial broadcasting was relatively limited.3  The 
arrival of digital television complicates this picture somewhat, as it enables the terrestrial 
broadcasters to develop niche channels which, it can be argued, are not intended to provide 
content that appeals to ‘mass’ audiences. The larger problem now is that, in an era of near-
universal access to the Internet, and to global video content services such as YouTube, 
Vimeo, Dailymotion, Facebook and myriad other video content sharing services, such 
distinctions are very hard to sustain.  Given that such services are not bound to any single 
territorial jurisdiction, the question of who could regulate content for such services, even if 
there was a political will to do so, is highly contentions.  
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In Australia, issues such as these were considered in the National Classification Scheme 
Review, undertaken by the Australian Law Reform Commission during 2011, with its Final 
Report, Classification—Content Regulation and Convergent Media, released in February 
2012 (ALRC 2012). The general purpose of this Review was to recommend reforms to the 
legal and regulatory framework for the classification of media content in Australia, in the 
context of technological convergence, changes in media consumption and community 
expectations about media content, and the future development of Australian media and digital 
content industries.  In relation to television, two significant questions arose. The first is 
whether the existence of multiple terrestrial (free-to-air) digital channels points to a need to 
relax content restrictions on the main broadcasting channels. 
 
In considering this question, some relevant issues are:  
 the now quite large audiences such channels attract, accounting for up to 25 per cent 
of television viewing in Australia;  
 the existence of various specialist channels offered by the public broadcasters, 
including two children’s channels offered by the Australian Broadcasting Corporation 
(ABC); 
  the growth of catch-up TV viewing through services such as the ABC’s iView and 
the BBC’s iPlayer as well as through the Internet;  
 the quite different rules that apply to such matters as time-zone restrictions 
(‘watershed hours’) for programs broadcast on the digital multichannels as compared 
to the main channels;  and 
 the availability of parental locking devices on all new televisions sold in Australia.  
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The Review recommended a gradual relaxation of restrictions applying to the main terrestrial 
channels in recognition of what are now significantly changing viewer approaches to 
television in Australia. For example, content specifically aimed at children of different ages 
on ABC2 and ABC3 would suggest that the rules governing times at which content that is 
rated other than ‘G’ (General) should be relaxed. Most importantly it was recommended that 
any new broadcasting legislation should not contain any mandates on when particular types 
of programs can be shown on television, so that such guidelines are set through industry 
codes developed in consultation with the public and through negotiation with the Australian 
Communication and Media Authority (ACMA). In this way, there is sufficient flexibility to 
respond to changes in community expectations as well as new technologies while enabling 
the principles associated with media content classification, such as consumer information and 
the protection of children, to continue to have relevance and force (ALRC 2012: 192-196).  
 
The issues presented by Internet-based video sharing services are far more complex. At some 
level, national regulators need to acknowledge that much of the work related to management 
of such content can only be undertaken by the content service providers themselves, and that 
the national regulators can draw upon the experience that they have with the content which 
they can classify – typically feature films, some television programs, and some computer 
games – to provide guidance to those services themselves about how they may operate within 
particular countries.  
 
The ALRC review referred to this as deeming, whereby content that has been subject to an 
authorised classification system in another jurisdiction (e.g. computer games classified by the 
Pan-European Games Initiative or the US-based Entertainment Software Rating Board) 
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would be deemed to have an equivalent classification in Australia unless there were reasons 
to consider reclassifying the content. Extending this logic, decisions made by global content 
service providers such as Google, Apple and Microsoft may be deemed to apply in countries 
such as Australia subject to the national regulator continuing to have powers to determine the 
bases on which decisions were being made, in negotiation with the provider (Flew 2012). In 
more general terms, the ALRC sought to develop a platform-neutral approach to media 
content regulation, where the focus was on the content itself rather than on its delivery 
platform (e.g. a feature film is classified, but the same content accessed over the Internet is 
not), with the content being considered appropriate for classification if it was ‘made and 
distributed on a commercial basis and has a significant Australian audience’ (ALRC 2012: 
125).  
 
Global Content Aggregators and the New Ownership Landscape 
 
A final changing conception of media influence to be considered concerns the implications of 
media convergence for how we think about ownership concentration and market power. The 
most commonly used measure of media ownership in media economics is the concentration 
ratio, which measures what percentage of a market is controlled by the top four or top eight 
firms in an industry. As a general rule, media industries tend to be oligopolistic, with the top 
four firms dominating the market. This in turn raises issues about uses of market power, such 
as prices being unreasonably high, the maintenance of barriers to entry, collusion among 
industry participants, and the ability to translate this economic power into the exercise of 
political power in ways that may be at odds with principles concerning the role of media in 
democratic societies (Gomery 1989; Doyle 2013).  
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But the two key terms in this equation – industry and market – may be more slippery than 
they first appear. The cultural economist David Throsby makes the point that: 
 
Any self-respecting university course or textbook on industry economics spends some 
time at the outset discussing the difficulties of defining an industry—i.e. whether the 
concept of industry can be delineated according to groupings of producers, product 
classifications, factors of production, types of consumers, location etc. (Throsby 
2001: 112).  
 
The broader the terms are being used, the more challenging these questions become. 
Speaking of the newspaper, radio or television industry is one thing, but does it make sense to 
aggregate them as the media industries? Indeed, what does it then mean to align these 
industries with the arts, design, fashion, architecture, computer games etc. and refer to them 
as the creative industries? Likewise with a market: the UK is often thought of as having a 
national newspaper market but, as Collins and Cave (2013) note, Scottish newspaper 
preferences are quite different to those in England, and within England there are strong 
regional voices, such as The Yorkshire Post. These issues play out more strongly in other 
countries. In Australia, while there are 12 capital city and national daily newspapers, only 
four of these have any significant readership outside of one city; the rest sit within clearly 
delineated regional geographical markets.  
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Media convergence is blurring these lines even further. In his global study of media 
concentration, Eli Noam (2009, 2013) has argued that what he calls the ‘digital optimists’ are 
partly right to perceive that the Internet has reduced the degree of media concentration found 
in the 1980s, but that those of a more pessimistic view are right to perceive an increase in 
media concentration in recent years, driven by the increasingly global scale of media 
operations. But the big change in these debates, and the one that existing tools to measure 
media concentration capture poorly, is that a two-tier media system has been evolving, with 
large integrator firms operating in oligopolistic market structures being at its core, 
surrounded by a large number of specialist firms that undertake much of the actual content 
production (Noam 2009, 436-437).  
 
The second half of the 2010s was a period of crisis for many of the media conglomerates that 
had dominated the previous decade – companies such as Time-Warner, Disney, News 
Corporation, Viacom/CBS and Sony – triggering the debate about whether there was a ‘crisis 
of the media moguls’. But in many of the media markets in which these media giants operate, 
their challengers were now big ICT and software companies such as Google, Apple and 
Microsoft: newspapers compete for reader attention with online news portals; TV networks 
battle with YouTube for the attention of screen media consumers; TV programs, music and 
movies are increasingly downloaded from iTunes or Netflix; and so on. McChesney (2013) 
has observed that 13 of the 30 largest publicly traded companies in the United States are now 
Internet-related companies, and the largest Internet-related companies, such as Apple, Google 
and Microsoft, are now much larger than the largest media companies, such as Disney, and 
largest than the big telecommunications companies such as AT&T, Verizon and Comcast 
(McChesney 2013: 130-131).  
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The big Internet and new media players are coming to play an increasingly important role in 
traditional media environments. In Canada, to take one example, 34 per cent of the 
population access IPTV (Internet Protocol TV) services at least monthly in 2013, with 12 per 
cent of households subscribing to Netflix (CRTC 2013). In the United States, Netflix is 
expected to double its number of subscribers, from 27 million in 2012 to 54 million by 2020 
(Forbes 2013). Cunningham and Silver (2013) have analysed how the ‘new King Kongs’ of 
online media distribution such as Google, Apple, Amazon and Netflix have become 
commissioners of original content as well as online distributors, with Netflix’s House of 
Cards series, starring Kevin Spacey, being the most famous example. Holt and Sanson (2014) 
identify connected viewing, or the recombination of television, computing and mobile devices 
as media viewing platforms as being ‘about more than digital distribution’:  
 
It is the broader ecosystem in which digital distribution is rendered possible and new 
forms of user engagement take shape. It is as much about the aesthetic and social 
experience of second screen media as it is about the intermediaries that deliver 
content to mobile devices and the gatekeepers regulating our Internet access. 
Connected viewing spans a wide spectrum of industrial practices, from multi-platform 
modes of production and distribution to the reconfigured promotional strategies and 
measurement techniques increasingly necessary to gauge marketing success in the 
digital space (Holt and Sanson 2014: 2).  
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One way of addressing such conundrums in terms of their policy implications was undertaken 
by Australia’s Convergence Review Committee. Asked to  ‘review the current policy 
framework for the production and delivery of media content and communications services … 
[and] develop advice for the government on the appropriate policy framework for a 
converged environment’ (Convergence Review Committee 2012: 11), the Convergence 
Review Committee proposed the bold concept of Content Service Enterprises (CSE). In 
proposed that the focus of regulation shift from being based upon platforms and licences 
towards a focus upon ‘significant enterprises that produce professional content to 
Australians’ (Convergence Review Committee 2012, p.10), the Convergence Review defined 
a CSE as a large media enterprise that: 
 
 Has control over the content that is supplied i.e. it is professionally-produced media 
content; 
 Has a large number of Australians who use or access that content; 
 Derives significant revenue from supplying that content to Australians.  
 
The Convergence Review took the view that CSEs should continue to be subject to those 
forms of media regulation that Australians continued to see as being important, including: 
public interest tests in relation to changes in ownership and control; classification information 
about content and access restrictions where appropriate; community expectations concerning 
fairness, accuracy and transparency in their reporting of news and information; and 
contributing to the overall level of local content production, in order to contribute to a 
national culture.  
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The regulatory radicalism of the CSE proposal failed to get traction in the legislation that 
subsequently appeared. For the most part, the print, radio, television and Internet industries 
continue to approach public policy in platform-specific terms, and governments are evaluated 
on what they may deliver or not deliver to each industry in isolation. It is, however, 
interesting to note that companies such as Google responded to these recommendations not 
by outright rejection of regulation, but by instead arguing that they are already significantly 
contributing to Australian content and culture. In the report titled Culture Boom: How Digital 
Media are Invigorating Australia (Belza et. al. 2012), undertaken by the Boston Consulting 
Group and commissioned by Google Australia, it was argued that Australian online content 
creators were already generating a consumer surplus for Australians as well as generating 
new export opportunities, and that new local content rules for companies such as Google 
were unnecessary as they were already making a positive contribution to the local media 
content environment. They were, however, prepared to accept that they are at some level in 
the media business, even if not in the form of mass broadcast media that dominated the latter 
part of the 20th century.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper has sought to critically reflect upon the ways in which the concept of ‘media 
influence’, which has long been a staple of both media and communications studies and 
public policy, is relevant in the contemporary convergent media environment  through three 
case studies. The first case of the 2013 Australian Federal election raised the question of 
whether the partisanship of newspaper coverage continues to have an impact upon election 
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results. While obviously support from some newspapers helps a political party at some level, 
and hinders the party it opposes, the evidence from the Australian case suggests that the 
influence of anti-Labor coverage in the campaign was not ultimately that significant. Any 
further empirical work on this question would, as the media influence literature has long 
suggested, need to consider a range of intervening variables, including party leaderships, 
variations across Australia in overall voting patterns, and the role played by minor parties in 
the final result, most of whom received little media coverage at all. It should not surprise that 
intervening variables prove to be important, as this has been a longstanding observation from 
the media influence literature.  
 
The second case study considered how broadcasting legislation in the United Kingdom and 
Australia has sought to set differential regulatory requirements for broadcasting and cable 
services. It was argued that the traditional distinctions, based upon universality of access or 
whether the service is user-pays, do not hold in an era where over-the-top video streaming 
services are providing freely available content over universally available devices. The 
challenge presented by the OTT services is part of the wider uncoupling of media content 
from specific platforms in an era of media convergence, presenting the challenge of how to 
devise regulations that relate to media content that can be platform neutral in their 
application. 
 
Finally, the paper discusses the implications of multi-platform content aggregators with their 
roots in the ICT and software industries for how we think about key aspects of media policy, 
such as media ownership and content laws. The definition of ‘media’ that we have been 
working with in legislation, with its neat divisions between broadcasting and 
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telecommunications, and its bracketing off of these spheres from convergent 
communications, is becoming less and less tenable, since it has ever less ability to explain 
how the world’s largest companies in these businesses – familiar names such as Google, 
Apple, Microsoft, Amazon and Facebook – now operate. Any future discussion of ‘media 
influence’ is going to have to go beyond traditional media, and consider the influence of 
media content aggregators in their various shifting forms.  
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1 A version of this paper was presented to students and staff at the Department of Sociology, 
City University, London, on 21 October 2013. My thanks to Petros Iosifidis for organising 
the event, and to Carolina Matos for chairing the discussion.  
2  The term ‘BRICS’ refers to Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Korea. In general, it 
draws attention to the rising influence of emerging nations, most of which are outside of the 
OECD, in the global economy. In terms of media, nations such as South Africa, Indonesia, 
Lebanon, Egypt, Nigeria, Mexico, and the Gulf states also warrant attention in this regard.  
3 The distinction works less well in countries where the percentage of the population who 
subscribe to cable and satellite services is high. Market penetration rates for Australia (30%) 
and the United Kingdom (50%) are, for example, considerably lower than the 85-90% 
penetration rates found in the United States and Canada, and where most consumers 
experience network and cable television as essentially a part of the same service.  
